

# Gendering security: The substantive representation of women in the Israeli parliament

European Journal of Women's Studies

1–21

© The Author(s) 2016

Reprints and permissions:

sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav

DOI: 10.1177/1350506816684898

journals.sagepub.com/home/ejw



**Reut Itzkovitch-Malka**

The Open University of Israel, Ra'anana, Israel

**Chen Friedberg**

Israel Democracy Institute, Jerusalem, Israel; Ariel University, Ariel, Israel

## Abstract

The study focuses on the links between gender and national security in the legislative arena in Israel, considering whether men and women legislators prioritize security differently, alongside other thematic policy areas. The centrality of national security issues in Israeli politics makes it a good case study for these questions, as it enhances existing gendered stereotypes. The article examines two competing hypotheses. The first suggests that Israeli female legislators will mostly refrain from addressing national security policy issues, focusing instead on softer policy issues, such as gender equality, education, health, and welfare. The second suggests the opposite, claiming that women legislators in Israel will align themselves with their male counterparts' set of priorities, focusing heavily on issues related to national security. The study finds support mostly for the former: Israeli female legislators are especially active in policy areas relating to women's issues and children/family and are less active in regard to national security, a policy area heavily dominated by male legislators.

## Keywords

Gender-based stereotypes, legislative behavior, gender regime, gender inequality, women and politics

---

## Corresponding author:

Reut Itzkovitch-Malka, The Open University of Israel, 1 University Road, Ra'anana, 43537, Israel.

Email: reutim@openu.ac.il

## Introduction

Numerous scholars have studied the reciprocal relationship between the descriptive representation of women – i.e., their percentage in parliament – and their substantive representation – i.e., the representation of their views and interests in parliament (see Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers, 2007; Bratton, 2005; Celis, 2012; Childs and Krook, 2009; Cowell-Meyers and Langbein, 2009; Heath et al., 2005; Hoskyns, 1996; Lloren, 2015; Meyer, 2003; Reingold and Swers, 2011; Rodriguez-Garcia, 2015; Schwindt-Bayer, 2006; Smooth, 2011; Trimble, 2006; Trimble and Arscott, 2003; Weldon, 2002, 2006; Wängnerud, 2000). While most found that women legislators make a substantive difference, this difference is often contextual and contingent on institutional, partisan, and cultural factors.

This study taps into this question by focusing on the relation between gender and national security. Specifically, we consider whether women and men legislators prioritize security differently, comparing this to their behavior in other policy areas. We conduct this examination in the Israeli context, which is characterized by a predominance of security issues. Due to the ongoing Israeli–Palestinian conflict the Israeli social and political context is characterized by a heavy focus on national security, constant existential threats, and the experience of life with terror – all of which bring security to the forefront, often at the expense of other issues. We thus contribute to growing research on gender and security/defense policy by addressing national security within the larger framework of parliamentary behavior and activity.

We believe Israel is an important case study due to its ongoing security situation and its militarized society, which is often portrayed as patriarchal (Abdo, 2011; Chazan, 2011). The acute security threats Israel has to attend to on a daily basis create a constant distraction from everyday issues, such as economics, social welfare, education, and gender equality. The militarization of Israeli society due to the prolonged armed conflict is one of the central elements in establishing the mode of patriarchal relations in Israel and the status of women in society and politics. The military in Israel – a highly male institution which presents a powerful gender regime – is one of the prime institutions contributing to the construction of gender inequality, due to its central role and status within Israeli culture and society (Izraeli, 1999). To that one might add the common Jewish and Arab socio-political patriarchal traditions, the perception of women as a tool in the service of demography, focusing primarily on their roles as wives and mothers, and the lack of separation between religion and state, which supports and replicates the patriarchal patterns and imbeds the gendered discrimination against women in the political and legal arrangements of the country. This socio-political context marginalizes Israeli women, both Jewish and Arab:

Patriarchy – which is the characteristic of all social structures ... – marginalizes and discriminates against all women. This is also true within the Israeli settler-colonial state, and especially the context of nationalism, national security and militarism. (Abdo, 2011:11)

But the relevance of the current study goes beyond the boundaries of Israel, as the connection between gender and national security has become more timely in the post-9/11 context, a context many perceive as one in which security has predominated in many, or

even most, politics. Moreover, feminist approaches to international law and national security often claim that women's voices are excluded from contemporary debates on terrorism, counter-terrorism, and national security (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2002; Huckerby and Satterthwaite, 2013).

In this study, we examine two competing hypotheses. The first suggests that female legislators in Israel, who are seen as less qualified to address national security policy areas, will address softer policy domains, often characterized as 'feminine,' and refrain from addressing national security issues. The second hypothesis suggests the opposite, claiming that Israeli female legislators will adapt to the national security ethos and, in an attempt to prove their worthiness and credibility, focus more on security policy issues, despite their supposed disadvantage in addressing such issues.

## **The substantive representation of women**

Studies of the substantive representation of women have yielded ambiguous results. The relationship between descriptive and substantive representation seems to be contingent upon both the questions asked and the methods employed (Childs, 2006). For example, some scholars contend that 'the ability of female politicians to represent women's interests is context dependent' (Koch and Fulton, 2011: 2), or, in other words, that there are no guarantees: shifting identities, differences among women, partisan loyalties, and institutional factors are all seen to play a part in shaping and constraining their inclination and capacity to 'act for women' (Mackay, 2008: 127).

Despite conceptual and methodological dissimilarities, many of the studies in the field do find differences between men and women parliamentarians, sustain the notion of substantive representation of women, by women, and show that descriptive representation increases women's substantive representation in terms of content and frequency (Atchison and Down, 2009; Carroll, 2001; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Childs and Krook, 2009; Gerrity et al., 2007; Kittilson, 2008; Mackay, 2008; Sawyer, 2012; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005; Swers, 2002; Wängnerud, 2009). For instance, Celis's (2007) historical research on the substantive representation of women in the Belgium parliament showed that female MPs were overactive in representing women in proportion to their percentage in parliament, devoted a higher priority to it, and invested more time and energy in their attention to women's interests. As such they were mainly responsible for the increase in the number of interventions in favor of women.

Schwindt-Bayer's (2006) study provides an interesting addendum to the empirical research on substantive representation. According to her, while there are substantial differences between male and female legislators with respect to behavior, when it comes to viewpoints and opinions, the sexes tend to be very much alike, with no apparent gendered difference. Her findings suggested that female parliamentarians propose more women-related legislation not due to their different priorities or worldviews, as concluded in previous studies, but because women are marginalized and 'channeled' toward women's legislative issues by the male majority in parliament. A study of six Latin American countries (Heath et al., 2005) on how new women representatives are installed in parliamentary committees supported this claim.

## **The Israeli political context**

In the 1950s Israel was ranked fourth in the world in terms of its descriptive representation of women in parliament, however, over the years the representation of women in the Israeli parliament did not continue to rise as it did in other countries and Israel was soon 'left behind,' comparatively speaking. Between the late 1950s and until 1999 there was stagnation in the number of women elected to the Knesset, ranging from a low of 7 (1988) to a peak of 11 (1992). Since 1999 there has been a substantial increase in the number of female members of Knesset (MKs) with their proportion steadily growing in each term (with the exception of the 2006 elections) and reaching an all-time high in the 2015 elections: 29 female MKs elected to the Knesset, constituting 24% of its members. This places Israel in the 56th place in terms of women's descriptive parliamentary representation and below the OECD average (IPU, 2016). Until 2003, left-wing parties were mainly responsible for the representation of women in the Knesset. However, since then this trend had changed and the women who enter the Knesset belong to parties across the entire political spectrum, excluding the ultra-Orthodox Jewish parties, and some of the Arab Islamic parties, which completely exclude women.

While there are many factors shaping this relatively low descriptive representation of women in parliament, we shall expand on two of the most prominent institutional ones: the electoral system and the party nomination procedures. The Israeli electoral system is based on a Proportional Representation (PR) electoral formula, a single nation-wide electoral district – encompassing the entire Israeli legislature and numbering 120 MKs – and a relatively low electoral threshold (Rahat and Hazan, 2005). On the one hand, the PR electoral formula is expected to favor the representation of women in parliament, especially in comparison to majoritarian electoral systems, as is often claimed in the literature (Caul-Kittilson, 2011; Matland, 1998). On the other hand, however, the extremely large electoral district, combined with the low legal electoral threshold, is expected to harm their representation. This is because such institutional conditions allow for the representation of many small parties in parliament. Given that women are usually placed in relatively low positions on party lists, the percentage of women who will serve in parliament on behalf of these parties is likely to be particularly low (Matland, 1998).

The nomination procedures used by Israeli parties are extremely diverse, as there is no regulation regarding the type of candidate selection methods parties should adopt. Today, Israeli parties are characterized by a dichotomy, using one of two extreme candidate selection methods: either highly exclusive methods, usually selection by the party leader, or highly inclusive methods, usually party primaries; intermediate methods are used by a small minority of the parties (Rahat, 2010). The exclusive methods are often considered better for female candidates as they tend to produce more representative party lists.<sup>1</sup> Inclusive methods, on the other hand, have the potential to impair the representation of female candidates (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). As a result, as part of the democratization of the candidate selection process, many Israeli parties have adopted voluntary gender quotas. Nevertheless, such quotas are usually modest in their scope (ranging from 20% to 33% in most cases) and do not set a high enough bar for the representation of women.

Few studies have examined the substantive representation of women in Israel and it remains a largely understudied research agenda. A worthy exception is Yishai's (1997)

study, which found that Israeli women legislators are often pushed onto less important parliamentary committees, considered the province of women (for example, the Education and Culture Committee and the Labor and Welfare Committee). Herman and Golan (2004), who analyzed the substantive representation of women in the Knesset from 1988 to 1999, further show that female MKs suggest more gender-related bills compared to male MKs. A more recent study examining the parliamentary behavior of male and female Knesset members in the 17th and 18th Knesset terms found that female MKs contribute more to the volume of legislation on issues related to women and their status in society compared to male MKs (Shapira et al., 2016). To this day, no study had ever empirically addressed the possible interactions between national security and the substantive representation of women in Israel.

## Gender stereotypes

Any discussion on the substantive representation of women, especially one focused on the links between gender and security, must address gender stereotypes. Comparative scholarship argues that women are consistently perceived as more compassionate, kind, trustworthy, gentle, and willing to compromise, whereas men are viewed as more aggressive, authoritative, powerful, and self-confident (Gordon, 2001; Huddy and Terkildsen, 1993; Matland and King, 2002; Wilson, 2004). In addition to these trait-based stereotypes, women are also confronted with belief-based stereotypes, often categorizing them as more liberal than they actually are (Holman et al., 2011; Koch, 2000, 2002). Women are also seen as more competent at handling such issues as education, welfare, and healthcare, but less competent at what are perceived as ‘masculine’ duties, such as the military, crime, and foreign policy (Alexander and Andersen, 1993; Holman et al., 2011; Koch, 2000; Koch and Fulton, 2011).

Because female legislators are stereotyped as holding different ideologies, character traits, and issue competencies than men, they may confront credibility problems when dealing with issues perceived as masculine (Koch and Fulton, 2011). Moreover, the centrality of national security, or the ‘atmosphere of war’ (Lawless, 2004), makes it even harder for female politicians to succeed: ‘Women fare as well as men when the political climate is dominated by issues that play to women’s stereotypical strengths, but are disadvantaged when “men’s issues” dominate the political agenda’ (Lawless, 2004: 479; see also Falk and Kenski, 2006; Holman et al., 2011).

It is possible, and important, to place this discussion in the broader context of the feminist theoretical perspective of gender relations. For example, the effect of gender-based stereotypes on the substantive representation of women can be analyzed under the ongoing feminist debate of *doing gender* versus *undoing gender*. While the classic concept of *doing gender* (West and Zimmerman, 1987) highlights the importance of gendered social interactions and has become a theory of gender persistence and the inevitability of inequality, *undoing gender* (Deutsch, 2007; Risman, 2009) stresses the existence of social interactions which are less gendered, where gender is irrelevant, and where institutional and interactional levels work together to produce change.

While theoretically, the idea of undoing gender raises hope, current research suggests that it is far from a reality. Focusing on contemporary manifestations of gender inequality,

Ridgeway (2011) asked how such inequality has managed to refashion itself in ways that allow it to persist. This question is highly relevant for the political world, where women have made incredible progress in terms of suffrage and eligibility to serve as elected representatives, yet somehow a 'glass ceiling' prevails. In Ridgeway's terms, the abovementioned gender-based stereotypes and credibility issues female legislators often face are yet another way for gender inequality to refashion itself and persist, despite the changing conditions.

## **Gender and national security**

In the last two decades, and especially since the events of 9/11, a growing set of scholarly literature has investigated the effect of women's descriptive representation on national security and foreign policy. Most of the research focuses on the propensity of states to engage in conflict, showing that the growing involvement of women in politics makes states less conflict-prone (Caprioli, 2000, 2005; Caprioli and Boyer, 2001; Hudson et al., 2008, 2012; Melander, 2005; Regan and Paskeviciute, 2003).

Koch and Fulton refined this general argument, showing that 'increase in women's legislative representation decreases conflict behavior and defense spending, while the presence of women in the executive increases both' (2011: 1). These findings are consistent with the literature on stereotypes: gender stereotypes may offer advantages to women in lower, non-executive levels of office (Huddy and Terkildsen, 1993), but at the executive level women may feel obligated to stress their aggressiveness and 'prove' themselves. In a study of US senators, Swers (2007, 2013) claimed that gendered stereotypes portraying men as more competent and suitable for defense policy made it harder for women senators to address such issues and that they often sought to overcome the credibility challenges on national security issues by sponsoring more defense-related bills.

In short, the issue of national security is highly dominated by men in most polities. This is because human conflict largely remains a male pursuit (Cohn, 1987; Goldstein, 2001; Tickner, 2001). As a result, women are disadvantaged in matters of national security. This disadvantage is more far-reaching in Israel than in other Western democracies due to the over-dominance of security issues driven by the geopolitical reality in the country. Men in Israel have substantial leverage for a political career over women, due to their salience in the military, especially in high-ranking or high-profile positions. A substantial number of Israeli MKs are of a military/security background (Goldberg, 2006), a fact which – in the Israeli political culture – portrays them as more competent or qualified for politics than others. Moreover, it is not uncommon for politicians, both male and female, to face accusations of incompetence for various political positions based on the claim that they do not possess sufficient military/security experience. Clearly, women face this accusation far too often as they do not have access to most high-ranking military positions (Rahat and Itzkovitch-Malka, 2012). While military service is mandatory for the vast majority of 18-year-old Israeli Jews, regardless of gender, this does not serve as a recruitment path or springboard to politics for women, as it does not provide the kind of military experience upon which they can build credibility to address national security policy areas. Women usually serve for only two years, generally in non-combative, administrative positions. It is only those who develop a military career – a male-dominated privileged group – that usually enjoy a fast track to

national politics and can claim credit and credibility to engage in national security policy issues. In other words, the Israeli political context enhances the gendered stereotypes which portray women as less competent to engage in national security.

## Research hypotheses

Given these circumstances, female legislators in the Knesset have two alternatives. The first is to mostly refrain from addressing national security policy issues, which, based on gendered stereotypes, they are considered less qualified and less suitable to address, and instead focus on softer issues, such as gender equality, education, health, and welfare. In a broad sense this argument is in line with Ridgeway's (2011) account of new and renewed forms through which gender inequality persists and with the concept of doing gender, as opposed to undoing gender mentioned above (Deutsch, 2007; Risman, 2009). There can be two possible explanations for this behavior: voluntary and involuntary. According to the voluntary explanation women strategically choose to engage in policy areas stereotyped as 'feminine' in order to 'leverage their gender to influence policy debates on a range of issues from health care and education to abortion rights and pay equity' (Swers, 2013: 3). That is, women may follow gendered stereotypes as a strategic choice to leverage such stereotypes into political gains. According to the involuntary explanation however, women follow gendered stereotypes as a result of coercion or the steering of the male majority. That is, women are kept from pursuing high profile parliamentary agenda, such as national security, by the male majority of the house and are steered instead towards lower profile issues. This raises our first research hypothesis:

*H1: Israeli female legislators will mostly refrain from addressing national security policy issues and will align themselves with existing gendered stereotypes, focusing on 'soft' or 'feminine' policy areas, compared to men legislators.*

Alternatively, Israeli women legislators may choose to challenge the gendered convention, aligning themselves with their male colleagues' set of priorities and focusing heavily on issues related to national security, despite their supposed disadvantage and existing prejudices. This option resonates with Swers' (2013) finding that US congresswomen who wish to overcome credibility challenges with regard to national security engage more in security in order to 'prove' themselves. In a sense, this is also in line with Koch and Fulton's (2011) argument that women who hold executive leadership aspirations will fight gendered stereotypes in order to prove their worthiness. While Koch and Fulton distinguish between women in the legislature and those in the executive, claiming this behavior is only relevant for the latter, it can be argued that, in the security-dominated context of Israeli politics, women are expected to 'prove' their worthiness and competence to operate in a manly, security-oriented territory as soon as they enter parliament, and not only once they have executive aspirations. This leads us to Hypothesis 2:

*H2: Israeli female legislators will heavily engage in national security policy issues, trying to fight the gendered stereotypes and prove their worthiness. This will come at the expense of addressing other, softer, policy issues.*



## Methodology

In order to study the substantive representation of women in Israel and explore the connection between gender and national security, we analyzed the patterns of parliamentary activity of women and men legislators in the 17th and 18th Knessets (2006–2013). Specifically, we examined two key areas of parliamentary activity: legislation and parliamentary questions. These offer a reliable reflection of the major spheres of activity engaged in by MKs.

With regard to legislation, we examined private members' bills (hereafter PMBs) proposed by Knesset members, as well as the laws actually enacted – that is, PMBs that passed the third reading and were accepted as law. We intentionally excluded government bills, which are seen as the product of the government working as a group.

The number of PMBs submitted in Israel is very high and comparatively unprecedented. The figure reached 4240 bills in the 17th Knesset and 4614 in the 18th Knesset. Due to the large number of PMBs, we analyzed a sample of all bills proposed. Using a systematic random sampling method, we selected one out of every four PMBs submitted to the Knesset. In the 17th Knesset, we sampled 242 bills out of the 977 proposed by the women MKs in our study, and 143 out of 583 proposed by the male legislators in the control group (on the selection of legislators, see below). For the 18th Knesset, we sampled 504 bills out of the 2006 submitted by the female MKs in the study, and 529 bills out of the 2114 submitted by the male legislators of the control group. As the number of laws which were enacted is much smaller than the number of bills proposed, we analyzed the entire population of laws passed by the female and male MKs.

The second area of legislative activity, parliamentary questions, is a rather popular oversight mechanism in the Israeli parliament, despite its obvious shortcomings and relatively low effectiveness. For purposes of our analysis, we studied all the parliamentary questions submitted by female MKs (857 questions in total) and the male control (802 questions in total) group in the 17th and 18th Knesset terms.

The research population includes all women legislators in both Knesset terms, excluding those who held a position in the executive: 14 women in the 17th Knesset and 19 women in the 18th Knesset. To compare the parliamentary activity of these female legislators to that of their male counterparts, we used cluster sampling to randomly sample the same number of male MKs (14 men in the 17th Knesset and 19 men in the 18th Knesset) from the various political parties in both Knesset terms.

Based on existing literature, in analyzing the data, we applied a modified version of Schwindt-Bayer's (2006) typology. Thus, we grouped the parliamentary activity into eight thematic areas: women's issues, children/family, education/culture, health, social welfare, economy, agriculture, and national security.

To analyze the effect of gender on MKs' parliamentary activities and to address the ties between gender and national security, we used negative binomial regression models. This is because our dependent variable is a count variable, i.e., the number of PMBs initiated, laws enacted or parliamentary questions asked by a given MK. In all our models, in order to isolate the effect of gender, we included several control variables that traditionally influence legislative behavior of MPs in modern democracies



(Heath et al., 2005; Schwindt-Bayer, 2006). First, as senior legislators are likely to sponsor more bills, to successfully enact more private laws, and to ask fewer parliamentary questions (which are perceived as a less important parliamentary activity) than junior legislators, we controlled for legislative experience. We measured such experience as the number of terms the MK has served. Second, we accounted for committee membership to ensure that the gender coefficient did not reflect the possible tendency of legislators to initiate more bills or ask more parliamentary questions that will eventually be discussed in their own committees. Committee membership is a dummy variable given 1 when the legislator is a member of a committee engaging in the same thematic area as the parliamentary activity analyzed and 0 otherwise. Third, to evaluate how much of an MK's parliamentary activity is determined by the party platform, we controlled for party affiliation. This is a categorical variable, including all parties from which we have observations in both Knesset terms (the reference category is the far right party, Yisrael Beytenu). Fourth, we controlled for the specific Knesset term, differentiating between observations from the 17th and 18th Knessets. Finally, we controlled for the total number of PMBs initiated, laws enacted or questions asked by a given MK, as some legislators are more active than others owing to their available resources and staff or their political agenda.<sup>2</sup>

## Findings

### *Private members' bills*

A descriptive analysis of the sample of PMBs submitted by male and female legislators during the 17th and 18th Knesset terms points to the existence of differences between men and women, some found to be statistically significant based on a chi-square test and some not (see Table 1). Female MKs initiated more PMBs (59%) than male MKs (41%). Breaking the bills down by thematic area, we discerned differing patterns of activity. The most noticeable difference was in the category of women's issues, where female MKs contributed 85% of the legislation in the sample (56 out of 66 bills), while male MKs accounted for only 15%. Examples of bills included in this category are the Fair Representation of Women on Judicial Appointments Committees Law; Retirement Age Law (amendment: Retirement Age for Women); Authority for the Advancement of Women's Status Law (amendment: Prevention of Exclusion of Women from the Public Space); and the National Insurance Law (amendment: Change in Qualifying Period for Maternity Benefits for Female Students). Women also proposed more PMBs in the categories of children/family, education/culture, health, and social welfare – areas often stereotyped as 'feminine' or 'soft' – while men MKs contributed the majority of bills in the areas of the economy and national security, considered more 'masculine' or 'hard.' The only exception is agriculture (also often considered 'masculine'), where there is near parity in what appears to be a substantially low number of initiated PMBs.

Table 2 presents the results of a series of negative binomial regression models with robust standard errors for each thematic area. The dependent variable in each model is

**Table I.** Parliamentary activity by gender and thematic area (%).<sup>a</sup>

		Women's issues	Children/ family	Educ/ culture	Health	Social welfare	Economy	Agriculture	National security	Total
Private member bills	Women	84.8* (56)	73.0* (65)	57.5 (65)	65.2* (45)	61.6* (101)	47.5 (106)	53.8 (7)	42.0 (29)	58.8 (474)
	Men	15.2 (10)	27.0 (24)	42.5 (48)	34.8 (24)	38.4 (63)	52.5 (117)	46.2 (6)	58.0 (40)	41.2 (332)
Laws enacted	Women	86.4* (38)	62.5 (25)	51.6 (16)	63.0 (17)	35.4* (17)	55.3 (31)	100 (3)	15.8* (3)	55.9 (150)
	Men	13.6 (6)	37.5 (15)	48.4 (15)	37.0 (10)	64.6 (31)	44.7 (25)	0 (0)	84.2 (16)	44.1 (118)
Parliamentary questions	Women	74.4* (29)	59.7 (43)	61.5* (150)	68.9* (104)	62.2* (97)	74.8* (137)	56.0 (14)	43.5 (47)	63.4 (621)
	Men	25.6 (10)	40.3 (29)	38.5 (94)	31.1 (47)	37.8 (59)	25.2 (46)	44.0 (11)	56.5 (61)	36.6 (357)

<sup>a</sup>Absolute numbers are in parentheses.

\*p < .05 (based on chi-square test).

**Table 2.** Determinants of the number of private member bills by thematic area (negative binomial regression models; robust standard error in parentheses).

	Women's issues	Children/ family	Education/ culture	Health	Welfare	Economy	Agriculture	National security
Gender	.671 <sup>†</sup> (.384)	.463 <sup>†</sup> (.253)	-.243 (.260)	.196 (.332)	-.416 (.294)	-.730 <sup>**</sup> (.267)	.439 (.582)	-.490 <sup>†</sup> (.280)
Legislative experience	-.128 (.138)	-.018 (.086)	-.281 <sup>*</sup> (.116)	-.011 (.151)	.033 (.078)	-.007 (.076)	-.576 <sup>†</sup> (.321)	-.181 <sup>*</sup> (.076)
Committee assignment	.488 (.307)	N/A <sup>*</sup>	1.58 <sup>**</sup> (.233)	1.14 <sup>**</sup> (.352)	.534 <sup>**</sup> (.253)	.334 (.211)	.605 (.771)	.676 <sup>*</sup> (.274)
Party: Meretz	1.30 <sup>**</sup> (.458)	1.29 <sup>**</sup> (.407)	-.731 (.754)	-.195 (.402)	-.536 (.340)	.368 (.265)	3.09 <sup>*</sup> (1.35)	-.813 (.684)
Party: Labor	-.094 (.445)	.919 <sup>†</sup> (.505)	-.324 (.307)	-.1.25 <sup>**</sup> (.379)	-.285 (.397)	.303 (.264)	1.49 (1.23)	-.1.54 <sup>**</sup> (.535)
Party: Atzmaut	1.81 <sup>**</sup> (.430)	-.290 (.594)	-.1.37 <sup>**</sup> (.233)	-.19.9 <sup>**</sup> (1.03)	-.008 (.338)	.438 (.288)	2.21 <sup>†</sup> (1.19)	-.15.6 <sup>**</sup> (1.06)
Party: Kadima	1.00 <sup>*</sup> (.416)	.722 <sup>†</sup> (.414)	-.755 <sup>†</sup> (.403)	-.140 (.393)	-.000 (.294)	.131 (.216)	1.41 (1.09)	-.635 <sup>*</sup> (.262)
Party: Likud	.549 (.745)	1.10 <sup>*</sup> (.471)	-.302 (.302)	-.180 (.416)	-.248 (.336)	.009 (.536)	.670 (1.54)	-.740 <sup>**</sup> (.289)
Party: Balad	1.07 <sup>†</sup> (.555)	-.011 (.585)	.611 (.678)	-.342 (.608)	-.265 (.329)	-.259 (.444)	-.14.1 <sup>**</sup> (1.34)	-.15.2 <sup>**</sup> (.749)
Party: Gil	-.27.8 <sup>**</sup> (1.13)	.944 <sup>†</sup> (.555)	-.022 (.284)	-.18.8 <sup>**</sup> (1.09)	1.71 <sup>**</sup> (.339)	-.15.7 <sup>**</sup> (1.08)	14.4 <sup>**</sup> (1.57)	-.15.1 <sup>**</sup> (1.06)
Knesset term	-.156 (.380)	.318 (.331)	-.109 (.257)	.522 (.388)	-.135 (.331)	.639 <sup>*</sup> (.264)	.453 (.735)	.135 (.376)
Total bills by one MK	.050 <sup>**</sup> (.013)	.041 <sup>*</sup> (.019)	.044 <sup>**</sup> (.012)	.036 <sup>**</sup> (.011)	.062 <sup>**</sup> (.013)	.042 <sup>**</sup> (.013)	-.009 (.030)	.028 <sup>**</sup> (.011)
Constant	-.2.75 <sup>**</sup> (.797)	-1.79 <sup>**</sup> (.600)	.104 (.280)	-1.26 <sup>**</sup> (.484)	-.352 (.349)	-.040 (.320)	-2.31 <sup>†</sup> (1.37)	.380 (.374)
Log pseudo-likelihood	-58.89	-86.87	-84.56	-72.19	-115.01	-128.90	-28.37	-67.46
N	61	64	61	61	61	61	61	61

<sup>†</sup>p < .10, \*p < .05, \*\*p < .01.

**Table 3.** Predicted number of private member bills by thematic area.

	Women's issues	Children/ family	Economy	National security
Women	1.18	1.73	2.66	0.86
(95% CI)	(0.82–1.55)	(1.08–2.38)	(1.5–3.0)	(0.58–1.13)
Men	0.60	1.09	5.53	1.40
(95% CI)	(0.24–0.96)	(0.36–1.82)	(2.9–6.82)	(0.89–1.92)
Marginal effect	0.58	0.64	–2.67	–0.54

the number of PMBs initiated by MKs in the thematic area. As the table shows, there are significant gender differences in many of the areas examined. Women were more likely to initiate PMBs on women's issues and on children and the family and significantly less likely to initiate bills on economics or national security issues. In these four thematic areas, the effect of gender is significant even after controlling for other factors which influence bill initiation patterns. In the other thematic areas, the gender coefficient did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. In general, none of the control variables was found to be consistently significant across thematic areas. Their effect is rather idiosyncratic and no clear patterns are apparent.

The substantive effect of gender is more complicated to discern, as negative binomial regression coefficients cannot be easily interpreted like OLS estimates. Thus, it is necessary to compute the marginal effect of gender on bill sponsorship. Table 3 shows the predicted number of PMBs initiated by female and male MKs in those thematic areas in which the regression coefficients were statistically significant. The marginal difference in the first two thematic areas tips towards female legislators: they are expected to initiate 0.58 more PMBs on women issues and 0.64 more PMBs on children/family than male MKs. In the other two thematic areas, the marginal difference goes in the opposite direction: men MKs are expected to initiate 2.67 more PMBs in issues related to the economy and 0.54 more PMBs in issues related to national security.

### *Legislation that was adopted*

Once we break down the laws passed by the men and women in our sample into our thematic categories, an interesting picture emerges (see Table 1). As with the PMBs, there is a considerable gap between male and female legislators in the category of women's issues. Women contributed 38 out of 42 enacted laws, that is, 86% of all the legislation on this subject. In the categories of children/family and health, gender differences are more modest, though women still passed the majority of laws. In the category of education/culture, men and women passed a similar number of bills, while in the category of social welfare, men passed more legislation than women did. With regard to national security, male MKs passed many more bills (16 out of 19) than female MKs, but for economics there is near parity, with women legislators passing slightly more laws (31 versus 25), so that the picture is mixed in this category as well.

**Table 4.** Determinants of the number of laws enacted by thematic area (negative binomial regression models; robust standard error in parentheses).

	Women's issues	Children/family	Education/culture	Health	Social welfare	Economy	Agriculture	National security
Gender	1.98** (.554)	.693* (.326)	.637 (.513)	.067 (.120)	-.601† (.314)	.146 (.153)	19.35** (1.16)	-.133** (.051)
Legislative experience	-.100 (.180)	-.267† (.166)	-.037 (.186)	-.062* (.029)	.059 (.085)	-.023 (.041)	-1.01† (.527)	-.053** (0.18)
Committee assignment	.046 (.719)	N/A*	2.35** (.548)	.341* (.174)	.404 (.374)	.451** (.154)	2.42† (1.33)	.422** (.110)
Party: Meretz	.337 (.752)	.590 (.693)	-.317 (1.16)	.106 (.503)	.600 (.503)	-.448* (.184)	-14.55** (2.27)	.090 (.145)
Party: Labor	.321 (.690)	.891* (.420)	-.341 (.617)	-.329* (.142)	.363 (.685)	-.192 (.231)	-16.25** (1.53)	-.046 (.072)
Party: Atzmaut	-.408 (.632)	-15.52** (.838)	-21.88** (1.16)	-.426** (.135)	1.05** (.385)	-1.20** (.269)	-17.71** (1.38)	-.577** (.151)
Party: Kadima	.417 (.857)	-.064 (.469)	-1.58* (.690)	.059 (.144)	.039 (.434)	-.342 (.211)	1.77* (.756)	-.127 (.088)
Party: Likud	.475 (.785)	.732† (.451)	.493 (1.05)	.218 (.209)	-.027 (.602)	.293 (.288)	-17.94** (1.18)	-.114 (.125)
Party: Balad	-20.26** (1.30)	-15.0** (1.10)	-18.47** (1.22)	-6.56** (.227)	-29.3** (1.13)	-6.36* (.265)	.344 (1.88)	-537** (.205)
Party: Gil	.737 (.736)	-15.4** (1.12)	-20.1** (1.16)	.878** (.140)	-28.4** (1.11)	-5.47* (.234)	-20.56** (1.25)	.013 (.070)
Knesset term	1.19* (.542)	.488 (.364)	-1.03† (.541)	.205† (.123)	.491 (.425)	.201 (.189)	-674 (.798)	.168* (.071)
Total laws by one MK	-.015 (.059)	.016 (.032)	.010 (.046)	.004 (.009)	.066* (.027)	-.003 (.013)	-.070 (.061)	-.002 (.004)
Constant	-2.52* (1.15)	-.997 (.715)	-1.04 (.788)	.168 (.195)	-1.50* (.599)	.462 (.243)	-20.17** (1.56)	.896** (.101)
Log pseudo-likelihood	-55.34	-58.28	-40.39	-70.49	-63.50	-85.14	-6.851	-84.98
N	58	61	58	58	58	58	58	61

†p &lt; .10, \*p &lt; .05, \*\*p &lt; .01.

**Table 5.** Predicted number of laws enacted by thematic area.

	Women's issues	Children/ family	National security
Women	1.37	0.90	2.08
(95% CI)	(0.45–2.29)	(0.57–1.23)	(1.94–2.23)
Men	0.18	0.45	2.38
(95% CI)	(0.00–0.37)	(0.21–0.68)	(2.19–2.57)
Marginal effect	1.19	0.45	–0.30

A negative binomial regression model of the number of laws enacted by legislator supports the descriptive analysis, showing substantial differences between women and men in three of the abovementioned thematic areas: women's issues, children/family, and national security (see Table 4). In the former two categories, women succeed in enacting more legislation than men, while in the latter category the opposite is true. Here, too, none of the control variables were consistently significant across thematic areas.

Computation of the marginal effect of gender on bills enacted by legislator revealed that women MKs are expected to enact 1.19 more bills on women's issues, 0.45 more bills on children/family, and 0.30 fewer bills on national security, compared to men MKs (Table 5). This is very similar to the patterns observed in the PMB analysis.

### *Parliamentary questions*

The analysis of parliamentary questions complements our previous analyses. While women legislators submitted more parliamentary questions compared to men in all thematic categories but national security (Table 1), a negative binomial regression model of the number of questions asked by legislators reveals the differences between the genders to be statistically significant in three thematic areas only: women's issues, health, and the economy (see Table 6). However, unlike the other activities examined (PMBs and enacted laws), gender had a positive effect on the number of questions asked in all three areas.

That is, women were more likely to ask parliamentary questions not only on women's issues and health, but also on the economy (see the marginal differences in Table 7). This is consistent with the finding that female MKs were far more active in asking parliamentary questions in general. This, combined with the lesser importance attributed to parliamentary questions, may indicate the status and caliber of women MKs. It suggests that women, being a minority in parliament, are marginalized into low-profile parliamentary activities that men are less inclined to perform (Heath et al., 2005; Schwindt-Bayer, 2006). Interestingly, with regard to the number of questions asked on women's issues, party affiliation was significant for all parties examined. In other words, party affiliation is an important factor determining the number of questions an MK will submit on women's issues. Nevertheless, gender maintained its significant effect when controlling for party affiliation.



**Table 6.** Determinants of the number of parliamentary questions by thematic area (negative binomial regression models; robust standard error in parentheses).

	Women's issues	Children/ family	Education/ culture	Health	Social welfare	Economy	Agriculture	National security
Gender	1.00* (.427)	.328 (.303)	.178 (.208)	.684* (.278)	.087 (.263)	.855** (.323)	.258 (.429)	-.185 (.316)
Legislative experience	-.139 (.164)	-.095 (.085)	.059 (.073)	.052 (.082)	-.066 (.083)	.209* (.102)	.330 (.210)	-.000 (.074)
Committee assignment	.167 (.425)	N/A*	.683* (.329)	.583* (.294)	.746** (.232)	.568* (.286)	1.14* (.466)	.259 (.441)
Party: Meretz	16.63** (.651)	-.067 (.426)	.429 (.327)	.434 (.496)	.587 (.309)	.394 (.650)	.886 (.736)	1.18* (.587)
Party: Labor	15.81** (.890)	.054 (.387)	-.321 (.425)	.656 (.417)	.201 (.416)	1.52** (.528)	.138 (.787)	.437 (.486)
Party: Atzmaut	15.64** (.514)	-.18.1** (1.09)	1.13* (.458)	.831 (.458)	-.1.63** (.256)	.149 (.426)	-.14.3** (1.22)	-.18.9** (1.12)
Party: Kadima	16.06** (.587)	.155 (.447)	-.066 (.345)	.727 (.458)	-.186 (.278)	.458 (.510)	.418 (.561)	.506 (.388)
Party: Likud	15.57** (.875)	-.647 (.670)	-.1.10 (.617)	-.345 (.697)	-.1.19 (.735)	1.00 (.674)	.861 (.863)	1.29* (.506)
Party: Balad	15.24** (.853)	.084 (.641)	1.10* (.420)	-.554 (.617)	-.1.43 (.529)	1.62** (.596)	-.14.3** (1.02)	.891 (.744)
Party: Gil	-3.08* (1.25)	-.18.6** (1.08)	.734* (.326)	.105 (.398)	1.26** (.265)	1.09† (.625)	-.15.1** (1.19)	.523 (.358)
Knesset term	-.139 (.164)	-1.00** (.327)	-.45.1* (.199)	-.704* (.294)	.099 (.262)	.035 (.258)	.212 (.545)	-.303 (.276)
Total questions by one MK	.021† (.011)	.021** (.007)	.023** (.004)	.019** (.005)	.022** (.004)	.017** (.002)	.010† (.006)	.020* (.008)
Constant	-17.92** (1.18)	-.111 (.372)	.350 (.381)	-.533 (.505)	-.133 (.371)	-1.81* (.748)	-2.78** (.875)	-.738† (.390)
Log pseudo-likelihood	-47.35	-73.62	-120.31	-97.41	-97.47	-91.02	-39.98	-87.49
N	51	59	58	55	54	53	50	61

†p &lt; .10, \*p &lt; .05, \*\*p &lt; .01.

**Table 7.** Predicted number of parliamentary questions by thematic area.

	Women's issues	Health	Economy
Women	1.45	3.76	2.96
(95% CI)	(-0.64–3.55)	(2.10–5.41)	(1.70–4.22)
Men	0.53	1.89	1.30
(95% CI)	(-0.46–1.53)	(0.94–2.825)	(0.60–2.00)
Marginal effect	0.92	1.87	1.66

## Discussion

In this study, we examined whether female Knesset members display different patterns of parliamentary activity than men, pointing to possible interactions between the overdomination of national security issues in the Israeli political sphere and the parliamentary priorities of female legislators.

By classifying parliamentary activity into thematic areas, we were able to reveal legislators' priorities. We found that Israeli female legislators were distinguishable from men in their parliamentary behavior, and, in accordance with the literature on gendered stereotypes, engaged more in women's rights, childcare, and family-related policy issues, while hardly addressing national security. This was found to be true for both PMBs and for legislation that was enacted, and less so for parliamentary questions. The scarce presence of women in the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee (5% in the 17th Knesset and 12.5% in the 18th Knesset) – a pattern of parliamentary activity which is not analyzed in this article – also supports this finding of women's under-involvement in national security issues. These gender differences remained sizeable even after controlling for various intervening variables, including seniority, committee membership, and party affiliation.

This finding, which supports our first hypothesis, can have two possible explanations: involuntary and voluntary. The former explanation builds on theories of the marginalization of women in parliament (e.g., Heath et al., 2005; Schwindt-Bayer, 2006), which speculate that the under-involvement of female MPs in national security issues is not necessarily by choice, but rather that they are kept from pursuing this high-profile agenda and steered instead to lower profile issues. This explanation of deliberate exclusion was also presented by Yishai (1997) to explain why Israeli female MKs are often pushed onto less important parliamentary committees, which are considered to be the province of women. This explanation is also in line with broader contemporary feminist theories of gender relations. The process of marginalization or exclusion of female legislators from the centers of parliamentary and executive power can be seen as yet another way for gender inequality to refashion itself and persist in the legislative arena, despite the incredible achievements women have made within this arena in the last century or so in terms of suffrage, eligibility, and representation.

The voluntary explanation is more strategic in nature. According to it, women legislators choose to leverage gendered stereotypes so that they work in their favor, rather than against them (Koch and Fulton, 2011; Swers, 2013). Based on the strong link between

gender and women's interests in many policy areas, women choose to engage in those and, by doing so, score political gains.

The Israeli context, which exacerbates the gendered stereotypes, makes both explanations highly possible: women are either pushed very far away from these cardinal issues by the male majority, who attempts to own them, or make a strategic decision to avoid them, as they know they will have to fight the gendered stereotypes ruling this domain. Nevertheless, adopting the abovementioned feminist frameworks of uneven political representation as an aspect of gender inequality might suggest the involuntary explanation to be more suitable for our findings and also helpful in understanding their broader implications for gender hierarchy in the political arena and outside of it.

The behavior of Israeli female legislators appears to differ from that documented by Swers (2013) on US female senators. Those were found to embrace gendered stereotypes and the political gains they bring to female legislators in some policy areas, but at the same time challenge those same gendered stereotypes and disprove them in other policy areas, such as defense. Israeli women legislators, on the other hand, do not try to combat gendered stereotypes, but rather follow and strengthen them (whether by choice or not). This can be attributed to the fact that the Israeli political scene is highly masculine and patriarchal, and the over-domination of security issues in Israeli politics and society makes it even more so. Under these conditions, the process of pushing women to inferior positions in the legislative arena is so powerful and the payoffs of trying to challenge the gendered convention are not worthwhile, leading women to try and maximize the revenues they can extract from it instead.

We cannot draw the conclusion from our study that it is necessarily the predominance of national security issues in Israel that affects the legislative behavior of women MKs, as there may be a number of other explanatory factors not studied here. It would therefore be wise for future research designs to comparatively examine this question, controlling for intervening factors. Nevertheless, this study sheds light on the sets of priorities adopted by Israeli male and female legislators, examining national security alongside other policy areas within a political context which could very well be relevant for other societies as well.

### **Declaration of Conflicting Interests**

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

### **Funding**

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research received funding from the Israel Democracy Institute.

### **Notes**

1. One important exception should be made here though – that of the ultra-Orthodox parties – which represent a growing traditional population in Israel and occupy approximately 10% of Knesset seats. Although their selection is very exclusive (Rabbi Councils which determine the lists) they reject the very notion of women's descriptive representation and exclude women completely from their candidate lists.

2. Some of the models' iterations included interaction terms between gender and the control variables, such as legislative experience or committee assignment, however there appears to be no interaction effect. Therefore we chose to present the most parsimonious models, those without interaction terms.

## References

- Abdo N (2011) *Women in Israel: Race, Gender and Citizenship*. London and New York: Zed Books.
- Alexander D and Andersen K (1993) Gender as a factor in the attribution of leadership traits. *Political Research Quarterly* 46(3): 527–545.
- Atchison A and Down I (2009) Women cabinet ministers and female-friendly social policy. *Poverty and Public Policy* 1(2): 1–23.
- Beckwith K and Cowell-Meyers K (2007) Sheer numbers: Critical representation thresholds and women's political representation. *Perspectives on Politics* 5(3): 553–565.
- Bratton KA (2005) Critical mass theory revisited: The behavior and success of token women in state legislatures. *Politics and Gender* 1(1): 97–125.
- Caprioli M (2000) Gendered conflict. *Journal of Peace Research* 37(1): 51–68.
- Caprioli M (2005) Primed for violence: The role of gender inequality in predicting internal conflict. *International Studies Quarterly* 49(2): 161–178.
- Caprioli M and Boyer MA (2001) Gender, violence, and international crisis. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(4): 503–518.
- Carroll SJ (2001) Representing women: Women state legislators as agents of policy-related change. In: Carroll SJ (ed.) *The Impact of Women in Public Office*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, pp. 21–23.
- Caul-Kittilson M (2011) Women, parties and platforms in post-industrial democracies. *Party Politics* 17(1): 66–92.
- Celis K (2007) Substantive representation of women: The representation of women's interests and the impact of descriptive representation in the Belgian parliament (1900–1979). *Journal of Women, Politics and Policy* 28(2): 85–114.
- Celis K (2012) On substantive representation, diversity and responsiveness. *Politics and Gender* 8(4): 524–529.
- Charlesworth H and Chinkin C (2002) Sex, gender and September 11. *American Journal of International Law* 96(3): 600–605.
- Chattopadhyay R and Duflo E (2004) Women as policy makers: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment in India. *Econometrica* 72(5): 1409–1443.
- Chazan N (2011) Gender, power and politics in Israel: Translating political representation into meaningful empowerment for women. *Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture* 17(3–4): 42–45.
- Childs S (2006) The complicated relationship between sex, gender and the substantive representation of women. *European Journal of Women's Studies* 13(1): 7–21.
- Childs S and Krook LM (2009) Analysing women's substantive representation: From critical mass to critical actors. *Government and Opposition* 44(2): 125–145.
- Cohn C (1987) Sex and death in the rational world of defense intellectuals. *Signs* 12(4): 687–718.
- Cowell-Meyers K and Langbein L (2009) Linking women's descriptive and substantive representation in the United States. *Politics and Gender* 5(4): 491–518.
- Deutsch FM (2007) Undoing gender. *Gender and Society* 21(1): 106–127.
- Falk E and Kenski K (2006) Issue saliency and gender stereotypes: Support for women as president in times of war and terrorism. *Social Science Quarterly* 87(1): 1–18.

- Gerrity JC, Osborn T and Morehouse Mendez J (2007) Women and representation: A different view of the district? *Politics and Gender* 3(2): 179–200.
- Goldberg G (2006) The growing militarization of the Israeli political system. *Israel Affairs* 12(3): 377–394.
- Goldstein JS (2001) *War and Gender*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gordon A (2001) Does the Oval Office have a glass ceiling? Gender stereotypes and perceptions of candidate viability. *White House Studies* 1(3): 325–333.
- Hazan RY and Rahat G (2010) *Democracy within Parties: Candidate Selection Methods and Their Political Consequences*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Heath RM, Schwindt-Bayer LA and Taylor-Robinson MM (2005) Women on the sidelines: Women's representation on committees in Latin American legislatures. *American Journal of Political Science* 49(2): 420–436.
- Herman T and Golan G (2004) The parliamentary representation of women: The Israeli case. In: Tremblay M (ed.) *Parliamentary Representation of Women: A Comparative International Study*. Montreal: Remue-Ménage Press, pp. 251–275.
- Holman MR, Merolla JL and Zechmeister EJ (2011) Sex, stereotypes, and security: A study of the effects of terrorist threat on assessments of female leadership. *Journal of Women, Politics and Policy* 32(3): 173–192.
- Hoskyns C (1996) *Integrating Gender: Women, Law and Politics in the European Union*. London: Verso.
- Huckerby JC and Satterthwaite ML (2013) Introduction. In: Satterthwaite ML and Huckerby JC (eds) *Gender, National Security and Counter-Terrorism: Human Rights Perspective*. New York: Routledge, pp. 1–14.
- Huddy L and Terkildsen N (1993) Gender stereotypes and the perception of male and female candidates. *American Journal of Political Science* 37(1): 119–147.
- Hudson VM, Ballif-Spanvill B, Caprioli M and Emmett CF (2012) *Sex and World Peace*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hudson VM, Caprioli M, Ballif-Spanvill B, et al. (2008) The heart of the matter: The security of women and the security of states. *International Security* 33(3): 7–45.
- IPU (Inter-Parliamentary Union) (2016) Women in national parliaments. Available at: [www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm](http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm) (accessed 3 June 2016).
- Izraeli DN (1999) Gendering the labor world. In: Israeli DN, Friedman A and Dahan-Kalev H, et al. (eds) *Sex, Gender, Politics*. Tel-Aviv: Hakibbuz Hameuhad, pp. 167–215. [in Hebrew].
- Kittilson MC (2008) Representing women: The adoption of family leave in comparative perspective. *Journal of Politics* 70(2): 323–334.
- Koch J (2000) Do citizens apply gender stereotypes to infer candidates' ideological orientations? *Journal of Politics* 62(2): 414–429.
- Koch J (2002) Gender stereotypes and citizens' impressions of House candidates' ideological orientations. *American Journal of Political Science* 46(2): 453–462.
- Koch MT and Fulton SA (2011) In the defense of women: Gender, office holding, and national security policy in established democracies. *Journal of Politics* 73(1): 1–16.
- Lawless JL (2004) Women, war, and winning elections: Gender stereotyping in the post-September 11th era. *Political Research Quarterly* 53(3): 479–490.
- Lloren A (2015) Women's substantive representation: Defending feminist interests or women's electoral preferences? *Journal of Legislative Studies* 21(2): 144–167.
- Mackay F (2008) 'Thick' conceptions of substantive representation: Women, gender and political institutions. *Representation* 44(2): 125–139.
- Matland RE (1998) Enhancing women's political participation: Legislative recruitment and electoral systems. In: Karam A (ed.) *Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers*. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, pp. 65–88.

- Matland R and King G (2002) Women as candidates in congressional elections. In: Rosenthal CS (ed.) *Women Transforming Congress*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, pp. 119–145.
- Melander E (2005) Gender equality and intrastate armed conflict. *International Studies Quarterly* 49(4): 695–714.
- Meyer B (2003) Much ado about nothing? Political representation policies and the influence of women parliamentarians in Germany. *Review of Policy Research* 20(3): 401–421.
- Rahat G (2010) The political consequences of candidate selection to the 18th Knesset. In: Arian A and Shamir M (eds) *The Elections in Israel 2009*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, pp. 195–224.
- Rahat G and Hazan RY (2005) Israel: The politics of an extreme electoral system. In: Gallagher M and Mitchell P (eds) *The Politics of Electoral Systems*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 333–351.
- Rahat G and Itzkovitch-Malka R (2012) Political representation in Israel: Minority sectors vs. women. *Representation* 48(3): 307–319.
- Regan PM and Paskeviciute A (2003) Women's access to politics and peaceful states. *Journal of Peace Research*, 40(3): 287–302.
- Reingold B and Swers M. (2011) An endogenous approach to women's interests: When interests are interesting in and of themselves. *Politics and Gender* 7(3): 429–435.
- Ridgeway CL (2011) *Framed by Gender: How Gender Inequality Persists in the Modern World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Risman BJ (2009) From doing to undoing: Gender as we know it. *Gender and Society* 23(1): 81–84.
- Rodriguez-Garcia MJ (2015) Local women's coalitions: Critical actors and substantive representation in Spanish municipalities. *European Journal of Women's Studies* 22(2): 223–240.
- Sawer M (2012) What makes the substantive representation of women possible in a Westminster parliament? *International Political Science Review* 33(3): 320–335.
- Schwindt-Bayer LA (2006) Still supermadres? Gender and the policy priorities of Latin American legislators. *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 570–585.
- Schwindt-Bayer LA and Mishler W (2005) An integrated model of women's representation. *Journal of Politics* 67(2): 407–428.
- Shapira A, Kenig O, Friedberg C and Itzkovitch-Malka R (2016) *The Representation of Women in Israeli Politics: A Comparative Perspective*. Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute.
- Smooth W (2011) Standing for women? Which women? The substantive representation of women's interests and the research imperative of intersectionality. *Politics and Gender* 7(3): 436–441.
- Swers ML (2002) *The Difference Women Make: The Policy of Women in Congress*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Swers ML (2007) Building a reputation on national security: The impact of stereotypes related to gender and military experience. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 32(4): 559–595.
- Swers ML (2013) *Women in the Club: Gender and Policy Making in the Senate*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Tickner AJ (2001) *Gendering World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Trimble L (2006) When do women count? Substantive representation of women in Canadian legislatures. In: Sawer M, Tremblay M and Trimble L (eds) *Representing Women in Parliament: A Comparative Study*. New York: Routledge, pp. 120–133.
- Trimble L and Arscott J (2003) *Still Counting: Women in Politics across Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Wängnerud L (2000) Testing the politics of presence: Women's representation in the Swedish Riksdag. *Scandinavian Political Studies* 23(1): 67–91.



- Wängnerud L (2009) Women in parliaments: Descriptive and substantive representation. *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 51–69.
- Weldon SL (2002) Beyond bodies: Institutional sources of representation for women in democratic policymaking. *Journal of Politics* 64(4): 1153–1174.
- Weldon SL (2006) The structure of intersectionality: A comparative politics of gender. *Politics and Gender* 2(2): 235–248.
- West C and Zimmerman DH (1987) Doing gender. *Gender and Society* 1(2): 125–151.
- Wilson MC (2004) *Closing the Leadership Gap: Why Women Can and Must Run the World*. New York: Penguin.
- Yishai Y (1997) *Between the Flag and the Banner: Women in Israeli Politics*. Albany: State University of New York Press.