This article contends that an important driver of turnout is the national stories embraced by citizens. We suggest the notion of 'story incentive,' whereby adopting a group's story components – those that connect the past, the future, and prominent national characters – motivates individuals to participate in that group's political activities. Leaning on narrative theories and studies on voter turnout, we develop and test hypotheses regarding the effect of story components on the likelihood of voting. Our measurements of story incentives are based on election surveys and encompass Denmark, Israel, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US. The results support the main story-incentive hypothesis. We discuss the theoretical ramifications of the connection between adherence to national stories and voter turnout. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our aim is to propose guidelines for the analysis of political personalization and personalized politics in general and for behavioural personalization in particular. The first guideline is based on our understanding that personalization comes at the cost of party politics. It suggests that in order to classify politics as more or less personalized, we must compare it to an alternative party-oriented politics. Based on a synthesis of existing theoretical work, the second guideline suggests three analytical dimensions to clarify the multidimensional concept of personalization: arena, level and character. Arena refers to where personalization takes place; level refers to whose power or independence is changing; and character refers to how personalization is manifested. Furthermore, we present the contributions of this symposium and explain how they follow the two guidelines and advance our understanding and knowledge of behavioural political personalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policy scholars tend to view disproportionate policy and its two component concepts – policy over- and underreaction – as either unintentional errors of commission or omission, or nonintentional responses that political executives never intended to implement yet are not executed unknowingly, inadvertently or accidentally. This article highlights a conceptual turn, whereby these concepts are reentering the policy lexicon as types of intentional policy responses that are largely undertaken when political executives are vulnerable to voters. Intentional overreactions derive from the desire of political executives to pander to voters' opinions or signal extremity by overreacting to these opinions in domains susceptible to manipulation for credit-claiming purposes. Intentional underreactions are motivated by political executives' attempts to avoid blame and may subsequently lead to deliberate overreaction. This conceptual turn forces scholars to recognise the political benefits that electe